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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-3345 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
RAMAR J. GARDINER, 
Appellant 
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 2-10-cr-00229-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Maurice B. Cohill 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 24, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. AND NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: August 22, 2014) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
Ramar J. Gardiner (“Appellant”) was charged in a five-count indictment for his 
involvement in a scam to defraud various merchants by purchasing gift cards with 
2 
 
fraudulent pre-paid credit cards.  Appellant pled guilty to conspiracy, and was sentenced.  
Appellant now appeals the portion of the District Court’s sentence which provided that in 
the event that he was not gainfully employed during his period of probation, he would 
have to engage in community service.  There being no basis for his objection, we will 
affirm.   
I. BACKGROUND 
The Honorable Maurice B. Cohill sentenced Appellant to a term of probation for 
four years, with six months home confinement.  Judge Cohill ordered Appellant to 
“support his . . . dependents and meet other family responsibilities” and to “work 
regularly at a lawful occupation, unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, 
training, or other acceptable reasons[.]”  (App. 76.)  
Approximately nine months into his term of probation, Appellant’s probation 
officer, Javier Enciso (“Enciso”), concluded that Appellant was not in compliance with 
the conditions set by Judge Cohill.  Enciso reported that Appellant “ha[d] been 
unemployed since the onset of probation” and that Appellant informed Enciso that he was 
not searching for employment because he was “representing a young music artist and . . .  
attempting to get the artist signed by a record label.”  (Id. at 147.)  Enciso informed 
Appellant that this was insufficient to meet the terms of his probation, and referred him to 
various employment assistance programs.  Nevertheless, Appellant remained 
unemployed, continuing, however to “work in the music industry[.]”  (Id. at 147-48 
(internal quotation marks omitted).)  Enciso “expressed his concerns [to the Probation 
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Office] that if [Appellant] is permitted to continue in this fashion, his chances of his 
recidivism greatly increase.”  (Id. at 82.)  Based on Enciso’s report, the Probation Office 
requested a modification of the conditions of Appellant’s probation.1   
The District Court held a hearing on the Probation Office’s request.  At the 
hearing, Appellant argued that he was in compliance with the terms of his probation.  He 
submitted evidence that he was working in the music industry with a company called 
Free Form Productions, representing a young music artist.  Appellant acknowledged, 
however, that he was not an employee of Free Form Productions and moreover, that he 
had only received one payment from the young music artist for his consulting work.  
While Free Form Productions submitted a letter stating that Appellant is a “very 
important part” of the company, “it doesn’t say anything about how much money they’re 
ever going to make.”  (Id.. at 141.)   
At the conclusion of the hearing, the District Court granted the Probation Office’s 
request, and ordered that Appellant “perform twenty hours of community service weekly 
at a site approved by the Probation Department any time he is not employed or actively 
                                                 
1
 The Probation Office specifically requested that Appellant’s terms of probation be 
modified to include a condition requiring Appellant to:  
 
perform 20 hours of community service weekly, at a site 
approved by the Probation Department, any time he is not 
employed or actively participating in an educational, 
vocational, or employment program.   
 
(App. 82.) 
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participating in an education, vocational, or employment program.”  (Id.. at 142.)  This 
timely appeal followed.   
II. ANALYSIS2 
 On appeal, Appellant contends that the District Court erred by modifying the 
terms of his probation.  Appellant also asserts that the additional condition imposed on 
his terms of probation constitutes an unlawful occupational restriction, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 3563(b)(5) and U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5.   
1. Modification 
Appellant argues that the probation modification was impermissible under 18 
U.S.C § 3563(b) because the condition is not reasonably related to the factors set forth in 
Section 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2).  We disagree.  
A district court “possess[es] broad discretionary authority to modify the terms and 
conditions of a defendant’s supervised release,” United States v. Wilson, 707 F.3d 412, 
416 (3d Cir. 2013),
3
 and accordingly, we review for abuse of discretion. Id. at 414.   
A district court’s modification of the conditions of a defendant’s probation is 
governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3563(c), which provides that,  “[a] court may modify . . . 
conditions of a sentence of probation . . . pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Rules 
                                                 
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2).    
 
3
 The instant case addresses a motion to modify the terms of probation, not supervised 
release.  However, the same standard of review applies and the parties agree that it is an 
abuse of discretion standard. 
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of Criminal Procedure relating to the modification of probation and the provisions 
applicable to the initial setting of the conditions of probation.”  Under this standard, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in modifying Appellant’s conditions of 
probation, as Appellant received a full and fair hearing in accordance with Rule 32.1 of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
4
 and the modification comports with Section 
3563(b), which governs the initial setting of the conditions of probation.  
Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary, the District Court’s modification of 
Appellant’s “conditions [of probation] are reasonably related to the factors set forth in 
section 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2),”5 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b),  and “involve only such 
deprivations of liberty or property as are reasonably necessary” to fulfill the purposes of 
probation.  Id.  The record demonstrates that Appellant is not employed, nor has he been 
since the commencement of the term of his probation.  Aside from his pursuit in the 
music industry, he is not seeking paid employment.
6
  Lastly, while Appellant completed 
some college level education, the record does not indicate that Appellant possesses other 
marketable skills.  Thus, the conditional community service requirement will further the 
statutory goals of providing him with “needed educational or vocational training” to 
                                                 
4
 Appellant does not contest this point.  
5
  Section 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2) contain factors that a court must consider when imposing 
a sentence, including a sentence of probation.   
6
 Appellant presented evidence that during his term of probation he created a sole 
proprietorship.  He argues that this should be considered gainful employment.  There is 
no evidence in the record to support the notion that time he spent on this was more than 
de minimis.  Therefore, the District Court’s determination that Appellant was not 
gainfully employed was correct.  
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obtain gainful employment, id. § 3553(a)(2)(D), and of protecting the public from further 
crimes committed by Appellant.  Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C); see also United States v. Restor, 
679 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1982) (indicating that “community service work was 
necessary to . . . integrate [defendants] in a working environment, and inculcate in (them) 
a sense of social responsibility”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in 
original); United States v. McKissic, 428 F.3d 719, 724-25 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 Moreover, the modification is not more restrictive than necessary because it does 
not apply if Appellant is either gainfully employed or “actively participating in an 
education, vocational, or employment program.”  (App. 142.)  Thus, the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in modifying Appellant’s conditions of probation to include a 
community service component.
7
   
Appellant also contends that the District Court failed to address Section 3553 
factors, which, he asserts, weigh “against imposition of the condition imposed here.”  
(Appellant Br. 23-24.)  We disagree.  As discussed above, the modification reasonably 
relates to the factors set forth in  Section 3553(a)(1) and (2).  We further reject 
Appellant’s argument that the District Court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors is 
insufficiently explained in the record.  As discussed above, the record contains a 
                                                 
7
 There is also explicit statutory support for including community service as a condition 
of probation.  Section 3563(b)(12) allows a district court to impose a discretionary 
condition that a defendant “work in community service as directed by the court.” 18 
U.S.C. § 3563(b)(12).  Similarly, the Sentencing Guidelines also provide that 
“[c]ommunity service may be ordered as a condition of probation or supervised release.” 
U.S.S.G. § 5F1.3.   
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sufficient evidentiary basis for the conditional requirement of community service.   
2. Unlawful Occupational Restriction 
Appellant also argues that the community service condition “must be vacated 
because it restricts [his] ability to work in his trade and profession.”  (Appellant Br. 32.)  
Appellant asserts that Judge Cohill “expressed . . . disapproval of [his] chosen 
profession” (Id. at 32) when he indicated that Appellant’s pursuit in the music industry 
was chancy, that he “might as well be buying lottery tickets” and that he did not 
“consider this to be gainful employment.”  (App. 141.)  We review for plain error, as 
Appellant did not argue a 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(5) or U.S.S.G § 5F1.5 violation before the 
District Court.  United States v. Warren, 186 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999.) 
Section 3563(b) and the Sentencing Guidelines give a district court discretion in 
determining the appropriate conditions of probation, including the imposition of a ban on 
engaging in specified occupations, businesses, or professions.  See 18 U.S.C. § 
3563(b)(5); U.S.S.G § 5F1.5.  The District Court’s modification does not however, 
impose such an occupational restriction.  To the contrary, the District Court specifically 
states that it “will be fine” if Appellant pursues work in the music industry, if he does so 
in addition to performing the community service hours or to being employed or actively 
participating in an education, vocational, or employment program.  (App. 142.)  
Moreover, the fact that performing twenty hours of community service may impede 
Appellant’s ability to pursue work in the music industry on a full time basis does not 
equate to the existence of an occupational restriction under Section 3563(b)(5) or 
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U.S.S.G § 5F1.5.   
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s Order dated 
July 11, 2013, modifying the terms and conditions of Appellant’s probation.  
